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Historically, corporations have mainly financed their activities with
two securities, debt and equity. The stockholders have responsibility for
the operation of the firm through the election of the board of directors;
the dividends they receive in return for their subscription of capital are
not guaranteed and are paid at the discretion of the board of directors.
In contrast, debtholders are promised a particular rate of return; they
have no rights of control unless payments by the firm are omitted, in
which case they have the right to foreclose on assets or, in some cases,
force bankruptcy. Dewing (1934, pp. 236-37) ascribes these differences in
rights between debtholders and equityholders to the historical distinc-
tion in Anglo-Saxon law between debtors and creditors.
As a result of the importance of debt and equity, the focus of inquiry
into firms’ choice of capital structure has traditionally been "What is the
optimal debt-equity ratio?" Modigliani and Miller (1958) and subsequent
authors1 showed that if capital markets are perfect and complete and no
taxes are in effect, a firm’s debt-equity ratio has no effect on its value
because investors’ opportunity sets are not affected by its capital
structure. If a corporate income tax is in effect, with interest deductibil-
ity, Modigliani and Miller (1963) used the same logic to show firms
should use entirely debt finance since this allows corporate taxes to be
avoided.
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This prediction of the theory did not square well with empirical
evidence; despite interest deductibility and a corporate tax rate of almost
50 percent at that time, firms typically used only moderate amounts of
debt. This led a number of authors2 to point to the capital market
imperfection of bankruptcy and liquidation costs. They suggested that a
firm balances these costs against the tax advantage of debt and it is this
trade-off that determines the optimal debt-equity ratio.
The trade-off theory has been criticized on a number of grounds.
Evidence on the direct costs of bankruptcy, such as lawyers’ fees,
suggested they were small (Warner 1977). Direct measurement of the
indirect costs of bankruptcy, such as the difficulties of running a firm
while it is in bankruptcy court, are difficult to obtain; proponents of the
trade-off theory suggest they are significant while detractors suggest
they are small relative to the tax advantage of debt. It is widely agreed
that liquidation costs, which are the costs of breaking up a firm and
selling it off piecemeal, are sufficiently large to explain firms’ observed
debt ratios if included with bankruptcy costs. However, Haugen and
Senbet (1978) argued that liquidation costs should not be included with
bankruptcy costs since liquidation was not implied by bankruptcy; if the
firm was worth more as a going concern it would not be liquidated. In
addition, they argued that if bankruptcy was costly it could be avoided
by firms’ buying back their debt just before it became due. These
arguments depend on perfect markets; a number of recent papers have
investigated why bankruptcy and liquidation may be linked and why
bankruptcy may be difficult to avoid by repurchasing securities when
markets are imperfect.3
The deficiencies of the trade-off theory resulted in the development
of a number of alternative theories. Miller (1977) pointed to the impor-
tance of personal taxes. He argued that personal taxes on equity were
lower than on debt and presented a model where this personal tax
disadvantage of debt entirely offset its corporate tax advantage so that in
equilibrium each firm was indifferent between the use of equity and
debt. De Angelo and Masulis (1980) and subsequent authors4 developed
this model to allow for bankruptcy costs and other factors; in this case
again a trade-off exists between the use of debt and equity and firms
have an interior optimal capital structure.
Some of the alternative theories that did not rely on the inclusion of
personal taxes were based on asymmetric information. Agency theories
2 See, for example, Kim (1978) and the references therein.
3 See, for example, Titman (1984); Allen (1987); Webb (1987); Giammarino (1989); and
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started from the premise that managers’ actions could not be fully
contractually specified because they were unobservable and would be
influenced by capital structure choices (Jensen and Meckling 1976;
Myers 1977; and Green 1984). Signaling theories were based on the idea
that firms’ capital structure choices could convey information about their
prospects to investors (Ross 1977; Myers and Majluf 1984; and Brennan
and Kraus 1987). More recently, it has been suggested that imperfectly
competitive markets for outputs and inputs and opportunities for
product innovation may influence firms’ choice of capital structure.5
The deficiencies of these theories in explaining the use of debt and
equity by firms are well documented by Myers (1984). He gives the
following succinct summary of the literature (p. 575): " ’How do firms
choose their capital structures?’.., the answer is ’We don’t know.’ "
Financial Innovation
The notion that firms finance their activities with debt and equity is
a simplification; corporations have issued securities other than standard
debt and equity for many centuries. Dewing (1934, p. 135) recounts that
multiple classes of stock with certain preferences or disabilities were
issued by some of the first English companies in the middle of the
sixteenth century. He also gives examples (pp. 377-78) of a number of
English firms that issued convertible securities in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.
In the United States, corporations also have a long history of use of
securities other than debt and equity. Since the late 1880s, firms have
issued significant amounts of preferred stock. This form of stock
combines many of the features of equity with those of debt; in particular,
a level of payments is specified, as with debt, but unlike debtholders,
investors in preferred stock cannot force bankruptcy if the firm omits
these payments. Firms have also issued income bonds at various times
since 1848. Like preferred stock, income bonds have a number of
features of debt and equity. Unlike preferred stock, the specified
payments are not at the discretion of the board of directors but depend
on the level of accounting earnings. If they are omitted, however, the
securityholders cannot force bankruptcy. Still other types of securities
such as convertible bonds and warrants have also been issued by
corporations for many decades. Dewing (1934) gives a full account of the
early history of these securities.
Financial innovation is, therefore, not a recent phenomenon. How-
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ever, Miller (1986) suggests that financial innovation has proceeded at a
particularly fast pace during the last twenty years. Not only have
corporations started to issue new securities such as zero coupon bonds
and adjustable rate bonds, but also entirely new markets such as the
Chicago Board Options Exchange have been established.6
Miller argues that much of this recent innovation is in response to
features of the tax code and to regulation. A classic example of
innovation in response to the tax code is zero coupon bonds. Before the
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), the tax liability
on zero coupon bonds was allocated on a straight line basis; that is, the
annual interest deduction was the amount to be repaid at the due date
less the issue price, divided by the number of years until repayment.
This rule ignored the effect of compounding of interest and created an
opportunity for corporations to avoid taxes by issuing long-term zero
coupon bonds to tax-exempt investors. When interest rates were high in
the early 1980s, the potential tax benefits from this type of security
became large and corporations issued a large amount of these bonds.
Although TEFRA closed this loophole, the market for zero coupon
bonds continued but now was mainly supplied by investment banks
"stripping" government securities into principal and interest (Kane-
masu, Litzenberger, and Rolfo 1986).
An alternative rationale for financial innovation, stressed by Van
Horne (1985), is that new securities may make markets more complete in
the sense that they increase opportunities for risk sharing between
investors. In a categorization of the primary factors responsible for the
introduction of sixty-eight new types of security, Finnerty (1988) lists tax
and regulatory advantages in twenty-seven cases and risk reallocation in
fifty-three cases. (More than one factor is possible for each type of
security.)
In addition to taxes and regulation and risk reallocation, another
important class of security innovation has resulted from attempts by
incumbent managements to discourage takeovers. Examples of these
"poison pill" defenses are preferred stock plans, flip-over plans, back-
end plans and voting plans. The securities associated with these plans
all have the common feature that on the occurrence of a takeover
attempt not approved by the board of directors, certain rights accrue to
the securityholders. For example, target shareholders may be given the
right to buy the stock of the bidder at a substantial discount on
completion of the takeover.7
6 For a full account of recent innovation see Finnerty (1988).
7 See Malatesta and Walkling (1988) for a more complete description of actual poison
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Tufano (1988) has constructed a data base of fifty-eight financial
innovations introduced by investment banks between 1974 and 1987.
These innovations, often bonds, equities or preferred stocks with novel
features, can cost substantial amounts to develop. Tufano finds that the
banks that create these products almost immediately face competition
from rivals offering imitative products. During the brief period of
monopoly before imitation, originators do not charge high prices to
recoup their development costs. Moreover, once the imitative products
appear, they charge a lower rather than a higher price than the
imitators. The main difference between the originating bank and imita-
tors is that the originating bank obtains a larger share of the market.
Tufano gives a number of reasons why market share may allow
originators to recoup the costs of developing the products. Sunk costs
may be involved in entering the underwriting business. These may
deter entry and allow positive profits; price competition may be limited
by the type of noncooperative collusion considered by the threat of
reverting to the single-period equilibrium. Another possibility is that the
bank may make profits on related business so that it can recapture the
costs in this way.
The fact that debt and equity are not the only securities that firms
use to finance their activities, and the constant introduction of new
forms of securities, suggest that a more fundamental issue than "What
is the optimal debt-equity ratio?" is "What are the optimal securities that
should be issued?" Many recent studies of capital structure have taken
this perspective. These studies provide some insight into the changing
nature of debt and equity.
This literature has two branches. The first has been concerned with
trying to identify the circumstances in which debt and equity are
optimal. This will be considered in the next section of this paper. The
second branch has been concerned with the optimal securities that a
firm should issue. The succeeding section considers this, followed by a
summary and conclusions.
When Are Debt and Equity Optimal?
A number of papers have identified situations where debt contracts
are optimal. Townsend (1979) considers the optimal contract between a
risk-averse agent and a risk-neutral principal. In one version of the
model, the agent requires funds at the beginning of the period to
produce a random income at the end. The principal can observe the
realization of the agent’s income only if bankruptcy is declared and the
agent’s income is transferred to the principal. This bankruptcy process is
cosily. Among the class of deterministic strategies, where the principalA FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 17
observes the agent’s income with probability either one or zero,
Townsend shows that debt is an optimal contract. This requires the
agent to pay a constant amount to the principal; if the agent’s income is
insufficient to pay this amount, then bankruptcy is declared and the
agent’s income is transferred to the principal.
This basic idea has been used by a number of authors to consider
the role of debt contracts in various contexts. For example, Diamond
(1984) used a similar framework to explain the use of debt contracts by
financial intermediaries such as banks. Gale and Hellwig (1985) consider
the case where the agent’s investment is mutually observable in order to
show that underinvestment can occur.
Allocation of Cash Flows
An important issue is whether this type of analysis can be applied
to corporate securities. If the agent is interpreted to be the insiders that
operate the firm, and the principal the outside investors that supply
capital, then the optimal security for the firm to issue is debt. The
question is whether equityholders correspond to the insiders that run
the firm or the outside investors. For privately held firms, the equity-
holders correspond to the insiders that run the firm. For publicly traded
corporations, however, most equityholders are outside investors with
access to the same information as bondholders; in this case it is not
immediately evident that Townsend’s type of analysis can be used to
justify the existence of debt and equity.
Williams (1989) develops a model to consider this issue. He assumes
markets are complete in the sense that everybody is effectively risk
neutral with respect to aggregate-state prices. However, asymmetric
information about the earnings of individual firms in any particular
period can only be observed by the managers or insiders that run the
firms; as a result securities cannot be made contingent on earnings in a
manner similar to Townsend’s type of analysis. In addition, Williams
introduces "ex ante monitoring," such as accounting controls, which
prevents the managers from simply expropriating a firm’s assets. It is
also assumed that an agency problem exists between managers and
outside investors. It is shown that it is optimal for the firm to issue debt
or stock or both to outside investors, with the precise mix of securities
depending on the nature of the agency problem.
An important issue is how general the assumptions of the model are
and, in particular, the circumstances in which markets are complete in
the sense that managers are effectively risk neutral with respect to
aggregate-state prices. One possibility is that the managers are risk
neutral; if they are risk averse, the fact that they cannot trade securities18 Franklin Allen
state by state that are contingent on the firm’s earnings will presumably
prevent markets from being effectively complete.
In addition to the applicability of this type of analysis to corpora-
tions, another issue to be considered is the assumption by Townsend
that strategies are deterministic, so that income is observed by declaring
bankruptcy with probability one or zero. Mookherjee and Png (1989)
show that if random strategies are possible, then the optimal contract
involves randomization. To see why it is possible to do better with
random strategies, consider the optimal deterministic contract, which is
a debt contract. Suppose that the agent is now made to announce his
income, and bankruptcy occurs with probability one whenever the
announced income is less than the required payment. During bank-
ruptcy, the true value of the agent’s income is revealed. By rewarding
the agent when he has correctly announced his income level, it is
possible to provide a strict incentive to tell the truth. This means it is no
longer necessary to force bankruptcy all the time. Since the agent is risk
averse and the principal is risk neutral, this change allows a Pareto
improvement. The important issue here is whether randomization is
possible. If a device exists that both parties know is truly random, then
Townsend’s type of analysis is unable to provide a rationale for debt
contracts, but if such randomization devices do not exist, it can.
Allocation of Control Rights
The papers considered above are primarily concerned with the
allocation of cash flows. In a recent paper, Aghion and Bolton (1988)
take a different approach by looking at the allocation of control rights
among different securityholders in closely held firms. They consider a
model with the sequence of events shown in Figure 1. An entrepreneur
has insufficient resources of his own to finance a project he wishes to
undertake. The project involves an outlay at time 0 and yields revenues
at time 1 and time 2. The entrepreneur can finance the investment by
issuing securities at time 0 to an outside investor who receives a portion
of the firm’s profits at time 1 and time 2. Both the entrepreneur and the
investor are assumed to be risk neutral, so that risk-sharing issues are
not considered in the model.
At time 1, the firm’s monetary profits and its prospects for future
earnings, which can be either good or bad, are determined. After
receiving this information, the party in control of the firm decides on
which of three possible courses of action to undertake: expand the firm,
continue as before, or liquidate. If the time 1 prospects for future
earnings are good, expansion leads to the highest expected profits,
continuing as before the next highest, and liquidating the least. If theA FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 19
Figure 1
The Sequence of Events in the Aghion
and Bolton (1988) Model
t=0 1 2
Entrepreneur issues Monetary/profits realized. Monetary profits
a security to finance The prospects (good realized.
an investment, or bad) for time 2
earnings revealed and
the firm either expands,
stays the same, or liquidates.
prospects are bad, the reverse is true. The private costs to the entrepre-
neur of the three courses are different, with liquidation being the most
costly, expansion the next most costly, and keeping operations the same
the least costly. The magnitudes of the expected monetary profits and
private costs to the entrepreneur are such that in the first-best world
where all states can be contracted on, it is optimal for the firm to
continue operations as before in the state where prospects are good, and
liquidate in the state where prospects are bad.
The critical assumption that Aghion and Bolton make is that
contracting possibilities are incomplete. In particular, the earnings
prospects cannot be contracted upon; the only variable that can be
contracted on is monetary profits. This creates two problems. The first
occurs if the entrepreneur uses securities that cede control of the firm to
the investor and the good state is realized. In this case, the investor
would like the firm to expand since this maximizes expected monetary
profits. However, this is not optimal since it imposes large costs on the
entrepreneur; when these costs are taken into account, continuing the
current level of operations is optimal.
The second problem occurs if the entrepreneur retains control. Now
if prospects are good the efficient action of continuing operations will be
chosen; however, if prospects are bad the entrepreneur may not have
the correct incentives to liquidate. The entrepreneur bears high private20 Franklin Allen
costs with liquidation; unless he also receives a high proportion of the
monetary profits so that most of the marginal benefits of liquidation are
obtained, it will be not be worth doing. The problem is that since it is not
possible to distinguish between states where earnings prospects are
good and states where they are bad, it is also necessary to give the
entrepreneur most of the monetary profits in the good state. The overall
payoff to the investor is then insufficient to make financing the project
worthwhile. Hence, a drawback also exists if the entrepreneur retains
control.
These arguments imply that giving the control entirely to either the
investor or the entrepreneur may mean the first-best contract cannot be
implemented: if the investor has control, the entrepreneur may be
forced to expand, which has high private costs; but if the entrepreneur
has control, he may be unwilling to liquidate because of the high private
costs associated with that. Ideally, what is required is a mechanism that
grants control to the entrepreneur when earnings prospects are good
and to the investor when they are bad. Aghion and Bolton argue that the
use of debt by the entrepreneur and the institution of bankruptcy can
achieve this outcome, if monetary profits and the prospects for future
earnings are positively correlated at time 1: for example, in the case
where they are perfectly correlated, when earnings prospects are good,
monetary profits are high and the entrepreneur retains control. When
earnings prospects are bad, monetary profits are low, and if the level of
debt issued initially has been correctly chosen, the firm will go bankrupt
and control will be transferred to the outside investor.
Zender (1989) also develops a model based on the allocation of
control rights where the use of debt and equity is optimal for closely
held firms. Once again, all agents are risk neutral so that risk-sharing
considerations are not considered in the model. The sequence of events
is illustrated in Figure 2. At time 0, an entrepreneur designs and sells
securities to two identical investors to finance a project. Individually,
neither investor has the funds to finance the project so both must
contribute money if the project is to be undertaken. The investor who is
assigned control then hires a manager who undertakes an effort choice
at time 1. No agency problem exists between the manager and the
investor, so the manager acts as the investor specifies. The time 1 effort
choice determines the level of a signal at time 2 and partially determines
the level of profits at time 4. In addition to the signal that is observed at
time 2, control is allocated for time 3. At time 3, the party in control
again specifies an effort choice for the manager. This, together with the
effort choice at time 1, determines the expected monetary profits
realized at time 4.
The problem in the model is to provide the correct incentives for the
effort choices at times 1 and 3. A single investor with sufficient funds toA FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 21
Figure 2
The Sequence of Events in the Zender (1 989) Model
t=O 1 2 3 4
Entrepreneur Effort choice that Signal Effort choice Monetary
designs and sells determines realized that partially/ profits
securities, time 2 signal and control determines realized.
Control assigned and partially assigned for time 4
for time 1. determines time 3. profits.
time :4 profits.
finance the entire project would obtain the full marginal benefits of the
effort choices and so would be prepared to undertake the efficient level.
However, because neither investor has sufficient funds to finance the
entire project, the securities must be such that both have a chance of
obtaining part of the time 4 payoffs. This means that the investor in
control does not get the full marginal benefit of the effort choice at times
1 and 3.
Zender shows that the optimal contract involves making control at
time 3 and the allocation of payoffs at time 4 contingent on the time 2
signal. If a good signal is observed at time 2, the investor in control at
time 1 remains in control and retains the residual of the payoffs less a
constant amount at time 4. If a bad signal is observed, then control is
switched to the second investor who obtains the payoffs at time 4. This
optimal contract is interpreted as the investor in control initially having
equity and the other investor having debt; it ensures that the investor
who is delegated control is made the residual claimant and so has
incentives to make the proper decisions.
Another paper that is related to Aghion and Bolton (1988) is Hart
and Moore (1989). They also consider a model of an entrepreneur who
wishes to raise funds to undertake a project when contracting possibil-
ities are incomplete. The focus of their analysis, however, is the problem
of providing an incentive for the entrepreneur to repay the borrowed
funds. It is the ability of the creditor to seize the entrepreneur’s assets
that provides this incentive.22 Franklin Allen
Figure 3
The Sequence of Events in the Hart
and Moore (1 989) Model
t=0 1 2
Entrepreneur Payoffs Payoffs
raises funds realized, realized.
for initial Assets can be Assets have
investment, liquidated for less zero liquidation
than the time 2 value.
payoffs.
The sequence of events in the simplest version of their model is
shown in Figure 3. A risk-neutral entrepreneur raises funds from a
risk-neutral outside investor to purchase assets that can realize payoffs
at times 1 and 2. If the entrepreneur does not fulfill the contract at time
1, the outside investor can renegotiate or can seize some proportion of
the assets and liquidate them. Liquidation is socially inefficient, how-
ever, because the liquidation value of the assets at time I is less than the
present value of the time 2 payoffs. Although both the entrepreneur and
the outside investor have symmetric information, third parties such as
the courts cannot observe the asset payoffs so these cannot be contracted
upon. The entrepreneur can appropriate the cash flows from the assets
for his own use, so the problem is to design a contract that provides
incentives for the entrepreneur to repay the loan.
It is shown that the optimal contract is a debt contract and the
incentives to repay are provided by the threat of liquidation. Since the
present value of the time 2 payoffs of the assets is above their liquidation
value, the entrepreneur will always want to hold on to as high a
proportion of the assets as possible and will be prepared to pay up to the
assets’ present value. In low payoff states, the entrepreneur will have
insufficient cash to make the required payment; the outside investor
therefore renegotiates the loan and liquidates a certain proportion of the
assets to make the payment up to the required amount. Although this
liquidation is inefficient relative to an ideal world, it is necessary because
the entrepreneur cannot commit to pay any of the time 2 payoffs to theA FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 23
investor. The threat of liquidation also ensures that the entrepreneur
pays the required amount in high output states.
One interesting implication of the analysis is that reducing the
amount borrowed is not always desirable. If the time 1 payoffs or time
2 liquidation values are uncertain, it may be better for the entrepreneur
to borrow more than strictly the initial cost of the assets. This allows him
to make a higher payment in low output states at time 1, so that a
smaller proportion of the assets is liquidated.
A version of the model where the assets pay off at time 3 is also
considered. It is shown that the use of short-term or long-term debt
depends on when information arrives and the pattern of payoffs.
Short-term debt gives the outside investor a high degree of control early
on since the entrepreneur has to renew the loan. This has the advantage
that the size of the debt can be kept low, which avoids the inefficiencies
associated with liquidation. However, it has the disadvantage that the
outside investor may liquidate projects early on even though this is
inefficient from a social point of view. For example, if information
arrives at time I that a project will have high time 2 payoffs and low time
3 payoffs, the outside investor may force liquidation at time 1, antici-
pating that it will not be possible to extract any payment at time 2. This
type of inefficiency can be avoided with long-term debt.
The papers by Aghion and Bolton (1988), Zender (1989), and Hart
and Moore (1989) provide rationales for the use of debt and equity by
closely held firms. Their analyses raise at least two issues that remain to
be fully resolved. The first is which results depend on risk neutrality and
which are robust to the introduction of risk aversion. The second is that
it is not immediately evident how this type of theory can be applied to
justify the use of debt and equity by large corporations. The problem is
how to identify the interests of managers with those of outside equity-
holders, given the latter are in a similar position to outside bondholders.
These are important topics for future research.
Allocation of Voting Rights
Another strand of the literature has considered the question of
control in terms of the way in which voting rights should be assigned to
securities. The aspect of equity that has been of particular concern is the
use of one vote per share and majority voting as the decision rule. A
number of papers have identified the circumstances where these provi-
sions are optimal.
Grossman and Hart (1988) argue that the voting structure of
securities is important primarily because of its impact on the market for
corporate control. When securities are widely held, a free-rider problem24 Franklin Allen
exists: individual shareholders do not have an incentive to carefully
monitor management and vote them out when they perform badly.
Monitoring of management is likely to be important when a single
individual or group has a large enough ownership share to make the
free-rider problem insignificant. A prime example of the type of situa-
tion where this occurs is the case of a takeover bid. Grossman and Hart
therefore consider a model where the allocation of voting rights and
dividends to securities is determined by its effect on allowing rivals to
obtain control from an incumbent management.
Initially, the firm is owned by an entrepreneur who wishes to draw
up a corporate charter that maximizes the value of the firm. Grossman
and Hart are interested in schemes that are privately optimal for the
entrepreneur. A number of different classes of shares can be created and
the share of votes and the share of dividends accruing to each can be
varied. The entrepreneur anticipates that these securities will be widely
held and that the firm will be run by an incumbent management. At
some date in the future, a rival team, which may or may not be able to
manage the firm better than the incumbent team, may attempt to
acquire control by bidding for the securities to which control rights are
attached. The incumbent team makes a counteroffer and holders of the
securities decide which offer to accept.
The critical assumption of the model is that management teams can
obtain private benefits from controlling the firm; the optimal allocation
of voting rights and dividends depends on the absolute and relative
sizes of the private benefits accruing to the incumbent management
team and the rival team. If private benefits are negligible, then the
allocation of control is unimportant and one share, one vote is as good
as any other allocation.
Grossman and Hart first consider the case where all securities of a
particular class must be treated equally, so that the whole class must be
purchased if the votes of that class are necessary for control. Suppose
that the private benefits of control are one-sided; for example, suppose
the incumbent team has no private benefits of control but the rival team
does. In this case one share, one vote is optimal because it maximizes
the amount the rival must pay to obtain control. If a firm has a voting
structure that allows the rival to obtain control by buying securities with
only a small proportion of dividends attached, then he can obtain
control and the associated benefits it provides to him at a small price.
This may even be worth doing when the rival cannot generate as high a
dividend stream as the incumbent. In order to make sure the rival pays
as much as possible for control and its associated private benefits, and in
particular at least as much as the value of the dividend stream provided
by the incumbent, votes must be spread as widely as possible. ThisA FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 25
implies one share, one vote. A similar argument holds if the incumbent
team has one-sided private benefits of control.
If private benefits are two-sided so that both teams value control,
one share, one vote is no longer optimal. The reason is that by
separating votes from dividends it is possible to get the incumbent and
rival to compete for control and pay for the associated private benefits
they obtain. Grossman and Hart argue that this case is of little interest
empirically for large publicly owned corporations, since the extent to
which management can extract benefits is limited by corporate law,
which gives a corporation’s directors a fiduciary duty to all sharehold-
ers. It then follows that their theory is consistent with the widespread
use of one share, one vote among publicly owned corporations.
Finally, Grossman and Hart consider the case where it is not
necessary to treat all holders of a particular class of securities equally; it
is only necessary for the rival to obtain the proportion of votes specified
in the charter to obtain control. This prespecified proportion is assumed
to be between 50 and 100 percent. Ignoring the case where both
incumbent and rival have private benefits of control for the reasons
mentioned above, the analysis of the optimal proportion is similar to
before. The main difference occurs when the incumbent has one-sided
benefits of control. In this case, it is optimal to set the proportion at the
lowest value of 50 percent, since this minimizes the chance of the
incumbent team maintaining control. Their paper thus provides some
rationale for the use of a single class of equity with control requiring a
majority of the votes.
Harris and Raviv (1988a) also consider the optimal allocation of
voting rights and dividends to securities. Although the details differ
somewhat, the framework is similar. One of the main differences
between the papers is in the focus of the analysis. Grossman and Hart
consider arrangements that are privately optimal as far as the original
entrepreneur who designs the charter is concerned; they do not consider
a criterion of social optimality, which includes the private benefits
accruing to the incumbent and rival management teams. In contrast,
Harris and Raviv do explicitly distinguish between private and social
optimality.
Harris and Raviv show that one-share, one-vote majority rule is
socially optimal since it ensures that the management team that gener-
ates the greatest total amount (including payouts to shareholders and
private benefits to managers) controls the firm. This is because the
arrangement allows the team that can pay the most to gain control; any
deviation gives an advantage to the incumbent or rival that may allow
them to gain control even though they generate a lower total amount.
The arrangement that is privately optimal for the original owner
involves issuing two extreme classes of security, one with all the voting26 Franklin Allen
rights and one with all the dividends. The reason this is optimal is that
it allows the securityholders to extract as much of the benefits of control
from the management teams as possible because it forces them to
compete for them. Thus, in general, the rules that are privately and
socially optimal are not the same.
Grossman and Hart obtain one-share, one-vote majority rule as
privately optimal, whereas Harris and Raviv obtain issuing extreme
securities as privately optimal, because of differences in their assump-
tions. Among other things, the two papers are concerned with different
parameters for the benefits of control the incumbent and rival can
capture. Grossman and Hart argue that the case where both have
benefits of control is of little empirical interest, whereas Harris and
Raviv do not make this restriction. If the private benefits for both
incumbent and rival are high, concentrating votes among a small class of
equity is optimal in the Grossman and Hart model.
In the cases where only the rival or only the incumbent obtains
benefits of control, both one-share, one-vote majority rule and extreme
securities are optimal arrangements in the Harris and Raviv model.
Extreme securities are optimal in these circumstances in their model but
not in Grossman and Hart’s, because Harris and Raviv assume that each
investor can construct an optimal portfolio containing both of the
extreme securities and that each investor’s tender decision can be
pivotal. This means that investors take into account the effect of
tendering their votes on the value of their nonvoting shares. In contrast,
Grossman and Hart assume each investor ignores any effects his actions
may have on the outcome of the tender.
These differences between the assumptions and results of the two
papers raise a number of issues. The private optimality of firms issuing
equity with one share, one vote apparently depends critically on the
assumption that the private benefits of control of the incumbent and the
rival are asymmetric. If both have significant benefits, then concentra-
tion of votes appears to be (privately) desirable. If this type of theory is
to explain the predominance of one share, one vote, it is necessary to
provide some theoretical or empirical justification for why asymmetric
private benefits of control is a plausible assumption. A priori, one might
expect private benefits would be symmetric, since the limitations on the
amounts managers can capture are set by corporate law and other
factors that are the same for both incumbents and rivals. The main
private benefit that can differ is, perhaps, the psychic satisfaction of
control. An important question empirically is, therefore, how much this
does differ between incumbents and rivals. Another issue is the best
way to model shareholders’ decisions; in particular, in close contests do
they in practice regard themselves as unimportant in influencing the
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Blair, Golbe and Gerard (1989) consider a model similar to that of
Harris and Raviv (1988a) in that they are concerned with social optimal-
ity and both the rival and incumbent have private benefits of control, but
these authors obtain rather different results. They are able to show that,
in the absence of taxes, one-share, one-vote majority rule and extreme
securities that unbundle voting rights and cash flows are equivalent and
both lead to social optimality. In contrast, Harris and Raviv show that
only one-share, one-vote majority rule is socially optimal; extreme secur-
ities can lead to suboptimal outcomes. The reason for this difference is
that Blair, Golbe and Gerard assume the rival and incumbent bid
simultaneously, whereas Harris and Raviv assume they bid sequen-
tially. Again, this difference in approaches and its effect on the results
raises the question of which is the most appropriate way of modeling the
situation.
The main concern of Blair, Golbe and Gerard is to consider the effect
of capital gains taxes on the allocation of voting rights and cash flows. If
capital gains taxes are in effect, then welfare is improved if extreme
securities are used. This is because a lock-in effect means capital gains
taxes may prevent a superior rival from winning if there is one-share,
one-vote majority rule; tax liabilities may be higher when the rival wins
than when the incumbent wins. Allowing separate trading of votes
alleviates this effect.
Taking the security structure of voting equity and debt as exoge-
nous, Harris and Raviv (1988b) stress the importance of capital structure
for takeover contests, because high leverage allows a controlling interest
to be acquired for a low outlay. Harris and Raviv (1989) combine this
idea with the approaches in Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and
Raviv (1988a) by considering the allocation of voting rights and cash
flows when the firm is not restricted to issuing just equity. They use a
similar model to that of Grossman and Hart. In particular they focus on
privately optimal securities, only the incumbent (or the rival) is assumed
to have private benefits of control, and each investor ignores any effect
his actions may have on the outcome of the tender.
The problem of the entrepreneur who owns the firm initially is to
design securities that prevent the incumbent management that has
private benefits from maintaining control when a superior rival appears.
This means that the cost of resisting takeovers must be maximized. As
in the papers focusing only on equity, one share, one vote among voting
securities is an important component of this, since it means that control
cannot be acquired cheaply by the party with private benefits. In
addition, they show that nonvoting risky securities should not be sold to
outside investors; if nonvoting securities are sold to outside investors,
they should be risk-free debt. The reason is again that these maximize
the cost of obtaining control and so tend to favor the superior rival.28 Franklin Allen
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The private optimality of one share, one vote in Harris and Raviv
(1989) again appears to depend on the assumption of asymmetric
benefits of control between the incumbent and rival. If both had private
benefits of control, extreme securities of some sort might be optimal as
in Harris and Raviv (1988a). An interesting issue is whether debt and
equity remain optimal in this case.
The models to analyze the design of equity that have been consid-
ered above are all concerned with the effect of voting when an incum-
bent management team is challenged by a rival team. Bagwell and Judd
(1989) take a different approach by considering the optimality of major-
ity rule where control is concerned with payout and investment deci-
sions.
The sequence of events in their model is shown in Figure 4. Initially
all investors are identical; they design corporate charters and issue
securities to finance firms’ investments. At time 1 investors discover
whether they are type A or B. Type As value consumption at time 1 and
time 2 and require a minimum level of consumption at time 1. Type Bs
only value consumption at time 2 and are less risk averse than type As
at that time. Just after investors’ types are discovered, firms decide on
how much of the cash generated by the initial investment to pay out to
shareholders and whether to invest the retained earnings in a safe or a
risky project. If investors have any cash remaining at time 1 they can
invest it in new firms. At time 2, the final payoffs from firms’ invest-
ments are realized and paid out to shareholders.A FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 29
A crucial feature of Bagwell and Judd’s model is the existence of
transaction costs for trading securities at time 1 after investors have
discovered their type. The particular cost that is modeled is the capital
gains tax. In the absence of this cost, investors would simply reallocate
their portfolios. Type A investors would choose firms that pay out their
required consumption at time I and invest in relatively safe projects and
type B investors would choose firms that invest all their time 1 earnings
in risky projects. When this type of rebalancing is prohibitively costly,
each firm will have shareholders with different views about its optimal
policy and control will be important. For example, suppose there is
majority rule and type As are just in the majority. In this case they will
prefer dividends to share repurchase even though the former strategy
involves a higher tax burden, because this allows them to maintain
control and implement the investment choice they prefer.
Bagwell and Judd show that the optimal decision rule in the
corporate charter depends on the level of these transaction costs for
rebalancing at time 1. For small transaction costs, majority rule is
optimal because investors can rebalance at low cost and not much
shareholder diversity is found among firms. However, for transaction
costs that are so high that no rebalancing occurs, majority rule is not
optimal. In this case the corporate charter should specify that the firm’s
policy is chosen to maximize a welfare function where the weights
assigned to each type correspond to their representation in the firm at
time 1. This maximizes investors’ welfare initially since they only know
the probability of being a particular type.
Bagwell and Judd’s model illustrates that control may be important
in situations other than takeovers. They focus on a particular situation of
this type. One issue is in what other circumstances control matters.
Another is how important empirically each of these possible scenarios is
in influencing the design of corporate charters.
Overall, the papers considered in this section indicate circum-
stances do exist where debt and equity are optimal. However, these
circumstances appear to be rather special relative to the wide set of
circumstances in which debt and equity are used in practice. Thus the
contribution of the literature to date is to provide some insights into why
debt and equity are used, rather than a single comprehensive theory.
The literature has also succeeded in identifying a number of important
issues and has provided paradigms within which to consider these issues.
What Are the Optimal Securities?
As mentioned above, the circumstances so far identified where debt
and equity are optimal are fairly restricted. In particular, most of the30 Franklin Allen
papers mentioned require that the firm or its investors or both be risk
neutral. Since it has traditionally been argued that one of the main roles
of the stock market is to allow risk to be shared, this assumption is fairly
restrictive. Moreover, the long history and extent of financial innovation
suggest that firms’ financing needs are not satisfied by debt and equity.
Rather than ask "What are the circumstances where debt and equity
are optimal?" another branch of the literature has been concerned with
the question "What are the optimal securities to issue?" The Modigliani
and Miller result, that capital structure is irrelevant when markets are
complete, suggests that the form of securities issued is also irrelevant in
these circumstances. In orde’r to develop a theory of optimal securities,
it is necessary that markets be incomplete. One possible reason for
incompleteness that is often suggested is transaction costs. Allen and
Gale (1988; 1989) have considered the implications of the transaction
costs of issuing securities.
Allen and Gale (1988) develop a simple model of financial innova-
tion with two dates and a finite set of states of nature. Information is
symmetric; the state is unknown to everybody at the first date and
revealed to all at the second. A single good exists at both dates, along
with a finite number of investor and firm types with a continuum of each
type. Instead of assuming that firms are restricted to issuing debt and
equity, however, Allen and Gale assume that firms choose the securities
that they issue and this determines the transaction costs they incur. This
means the market structure is endogenous and it is possible to consider
the theoretical issues raised by financial innovation.
The equilibrium concept used is based on that of Hart (1979) and is
essentially Walrasian. Markets are perfectly competitive since there is a
continuum of firms and consumers. Prices are quoted to both firms and
investors for every possible security. This includes all those securities
that are issued in equilibrium as in Hart’s model. It also includes all
those securities that could be issued but in equilibrium are not (that is,
demand and supply are both zero). This contrasts with Hart’s approach
where markets for these unissued securities are closed to investors and
prices are quoted only to firms.
The first result obtained is that under standard assumptions equi-
librium exists provided short sales are not possible. If securities can be
costlessly sold short, then equilibrium may not exist because short-
sellers are effectively able to expand the supply of firms’ securities more
cheaply than firms can. For example, suppose a firm can issue two
securities rather than one for some additional cost. In order for the firm
to be willing to do this, its gross value with two securities must be larger
than with one to allow it to recoup this additional cost. However, if
costless short sales are possible this implies an arbitrage opportunity is
available, since by going short in a two-security firm and long in aA FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 31
one-security firm, an investor can earn the difference between the two.
An equilibrium where all firms issue one security may not be feasible
because at the prevailing prices issuing two securities may be profitable.
Thus equilibrium may not exist unless short sales are ruled out.
The short sales constraint means that with incomplete markets
distinct types of investor value securities differently on the margin. The
price of a security, whether issued or unissued, is determined by the
group that values it most. In equilibrium, the firm issues the securities
that maximize its value and sells them to the groups or clienteles that
value them the most.
The second result obtained is that every equilibrium is constrained
efficient. In other words, a planner subject to the same transaction costs
for issuing securities and able to make transfers between investors at the
first date cannot make everybody better off than in the market alloca-
tion. This result arises because of the assumption that the prices of
unissued securities are quoted to both firms and investors. If prices are
only quoted to firms, then inefficient equilibria may exist because of a
pecuniary externality. To see this, suppose there are two types of firm,
each of which produces output in one state only. Investors have
Cobb-Douglas utility functions so that consumption in one state will not
have value unless consumption is positive in the other. If markets for
unissued securities are closed to investors, an equilibrium exists where
the firms do not issue any securities because the price quoted to them for
all securities is zero. This cannot be an equilibrium if prices are quoted
to investors as well, because at zero prices they would demand securi-
ties that allow them to consume in both states.
A third result is that debt and equity are not optimal but that the
optimal securities do have a particularly simple form. To see this,
suppose there are two types of investor, one type of firm and two states.
When firms issue only equity, the more risk-averse investors have a
lower marginal utility of consumption in the high-output state than the
less risk-averse investors; in the low-output state, the reverse is true. If
a firm issues debt and levered equity, the more risk-averse group will
pay a premium for the debt since it allows them to smooth consumption;
the levered equity will be held by the less risk-averse group since they
value consumption most in the high-output state. This split is not
optimal, however, because the debt allocates payoffs in the good state to
the more risk-averse group that values consumption the least. The firm
could obtain more for its securities by allocating all the payoffs in the
good state to the security that is held by the less risk-averse group,
which values consumption most in this state. In general, it can be seen
that optimal securities involve allocating all the firm’s output in a
particular state to the security held by the group that values consump-
tion most in that state.32 Franklin Allen
Figure 5
The Sequence of Events in the Allen and
Gale (1989) Model
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The critical assumption for all these results is the one ruling out
short sales. In practice, short selling of corporate securities is costly and
only a limited amount is undertaken (Pollack 1986). This suggests that in
some circumstances it may be appropriate to rule out short sales.
However, markets for stock options and index futures may represent a
low-cost substitute for short sales. This suggests that the case of
unlimited short sales is also of interest. In addition, the fact that
unlimited short sales is a crucial assumption of many models in financial
economics means this case is important theoretically.
Allen and Gale (1989) develop a model where unlimited short sales
are possible. The main differences between this model and the one in
Allen and Gale (1988) are that the number of agents is finite and the
sequence of events is as shown in Figure 5. Firms first choose the
securities to issue, these securities are then traded on competitive
markets, and finally the securities’ payoffs are realized. When choosing
securities initially, firms play a noncooperative game; they take into
account the effect of their actions on the equilibrium of the securities
market at the next stage.
In contrast to the model of Allen and Gale (1988), firms are not
price-takers; if a firm issues a new security it changes the security market
equilibrium. Nevertheless it can be shown that if short sales are ruled
out, then as the number of agents approaches infinity the equilibrium is
essentially equivalent to that in Allen and Gale (1988); each firm’s
actions have a negligible impact on the equilibrium at the second stage.
If short sales are not ruled out, the equilibrium of the model mayA FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 33
differ significantly from that in Allen and Gale (1988). Even if the value
of a two-security firm is the same as that of an identical one-security
firm, so that no arbitrage opportunity exists in the second-stage equi-
librium, a firm may nevertheless have an incentive to issue a cosily
security initially. A new security may increase the value of the firm in
the second-stage equilibrium relative to the equilibrium that would
occur if no innovation were made. Thus there can be an ex ante
incentive to innovate even when there is no ex post incentive. This is
true even as the number of agents approaches infinity. Now a single
firm can affect the security-market equilibrium even though it is negli-
gible, because the existence of short sales means that the open interest
in the security may be large.
The fact that firms are no longer price-takers ensures that the
existence of equilibrium is not a problem even though short sales are
possible. However, the equilibrium is no longer constrained efficient.
An example is given of too little innovation; the change in firm value
across security-market equilibria is such that firms fail to issue a security
even though everybody could be made better off if such a security were
issued and appropriate initial transfers were made. An example is also
given of too much innovation; in this case firms issue securities even
though everybody could be made better off if fewer securities were
issued. In the context of this model, therefore, the endogenous incom-
plete market structure that arises from profit-maximizing behavior is not
necessarily efficient. Another aspect of this result is that the equilibrium
with short sales ruled out may be superior to the equilibrium where
short sales are not ruled out. For a given set of securities, allowing short
sales improves possibilities for risk sharing. However, allowing short
sales reduces the incentives to innovate, so overall risk-sharing oppor-
tunities may be reduced.
As far as the form of optimal securities is concerned, an example is
given where debt and equity are optimal. This example is clearly a
special case, however, and in general the optimal securities have a
complex form that cannot be characterized simply.
This section has considered models of financial innovation where
corporations issue securities. However, in addition to corporations a
number of other types of institution such as futures and options
exchanges issue securities. Duffle and Jackson (1989 and the references
therein) consider innovation by futures exchanges; Allen and Gale
(1990) consider innovation by options exchanges. The implications of
incomplete markets for the design of government securities are consid-
ered in Gale (1989).
As with the literature on the optimality of debt and equity, the
literature on optimal securities is still at a very early stage. The results in
Allen and Gale (1988), showing that optimal securities involve allocating34 Franklin Allen
all the firm’s payoffs in a particular state to the security held by the
group that values consumption the most, provide some insight into the
option-like form of many new securities. However, the literature to date
does not provide much insight into the actual path of most financial
innovations. Its main contribution is again in identifying the theoretical
issues and in providing models to analyze these issues.
Summary and Conclusions
The traditional approach to understanding firms’ choice of capital
structure has been to consider firms’ optimal debt-equity ratios. This
approach has not been very successful in terms of providing an
understanding of the capital structures firms choose in practice. The
introduction of many new securities in recent years suggests the
alternative approach of considering the optimal form of securities that
firms should issue. The literature based on this approach has been the
subject of this paper.
The first branch of this literature has considered the circumstances
in which debt and equity are optimal. A number of ~situations where
debt is optimal have been identified. These typically involve a principal-
agent relationship where an investor (the principal) lends money to an
entrepreneur (the agent) to allow him to undertake an investment
project. A debt contract is optimal in these models because it ensures
that the entrepreneur takes a particular action. Although these theories
are suggestive of why a public corporation may want to issue debt and
equity, they cannot be directly applied in this case. Williams (1989) has
extended this type of analysis to public corporations by assuming ex
ante monitoring that prevents managers from expropriating firms’
assets.
The assumptions of all these models are fairly restrictive. It is
usually critical that either one or both parties is risk neutral and/or the
earnings from the investment or actions of the entrepreneur are difficult
for the outside investor to observe and so cannot be contracted upon. If
earnings or anything else related to the management’s performance can
be observed at all, and the management is risk averse, the results of
Holmstrom (1979) suggest that the optimal payments to the bondholder
should be conditioned on this information. In practice, even though
typically the parties are risk averse and some information on earnings is
available, payments on debt contracts are fixed and do not vary with the
available information. An exception is provided by income bonds but
these are rarely used.
Another part of the literature has looked at the question of why
public corporations typically have equity securities with one vote perA FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 35
share and majority rule. Most of these papers are concerned with the
effect of voting on the market for corporate control. Again, the circum-
stances where these results hold are rather special. Moreover, they
critically depend on the magnitude of the private benefits of control and
the distribution of these between incumbents and rivals.
Overall, the literature on the optimality of debt and equity suggests
that the circumstances in which these commonly used securities are the
best are fairly restrictive. This is difficult to reconcile with the fact that
debt and equity are so widely used. However, the literature has
identified a number of important issues and identified ways to think
about these issues. A similar argument can be made concerning the
literature on the form of optimal securities.
The results to date do suggest a number of important questions to
be investigated in future research. Debt and equity have been used in
numerous diverse situations. Why is it that they are so robust? What are
the incentives for firms to issue securities other than debt and equity,
and what are the general principles underlying the design of these
securities? Finally, even though the securities that are issued may be
optimal privately, the results of Harris and Raviv (1988a) and Allen and
Gale (1989) suggest that no particular reason exists to believe that they
are optimal from a social point of view. In other words, as far as the
issue of securities is concerned, it is not immediately obvious that the
"invisible hand" operates and ensures that market structure is efficient.
A critical issue is, therefore, under what circumstances the market
structure that arises is socially desirable and under what circumstances
government intervention is justified.
The papers considered above all assume discrete time. The use of
continuous time models to price derivative securities has not been
discussed. As Hakansson (1979) has pointed out in the context of option
securities, these models rely on the fact that dynamic trading strategies
make markets effectively complete. This makes the analysis of financial
innovation using continuous time techniques difficult. However, Mer-
ton (1989) has made progress in this direction by considering a world
where individuals face transaction costs but intermediaries do not so
that continuous time techniques can still be used. The relationship
between financial innovation and dynamic trading strategies is an
important topic for future research.
In conclusion, the theoretical literature has just begun to look at the
question "What are the optimal securities for firms to issue?" Recent
research has shed some light on the changing nature of debt and equity
by identifying some of the important issues in this area.36 Franklin Allen
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Oliver D. Hart*
Discussing a survey of the literature is never an easy task. In this
case the task is made harder by the fact that (a) this survey is very good;
(b) (perhaps because of this) I agree with a large proportion of what
Franklin Allen says. In fact, probably the only disagreement we have
concerns the assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of a recent
body of work that tries to analyze the optimality of debt and equity
arrangements. Allen believes that this work relies on rather restrictive
assumptions risk neutrality of management, unobservability of corpo-
rate earnings--and that current models can explain the existence of
debt, but not of equity as well. In contrast, I believe that the results of
these models are a bit more robust than Allen suggests. I will devote the
rest of my discussion to explaining why I think this is so.
My main point can in fact be summarized very easily: it is that debt
and equity are not just two out of a huge universe of potential financial
instruments, with the puzzle being why firms select them, rather than
the others, so much of the time. Rather I believe that debt and equity
have some quite special features, which make their selection (or the
selection of some variants) less surprising.
My starting point is the idea that in a world of transaction costs
where individuals can contract at best imperfectly over the uncertain
future, asset ownership matters. In particular, the owner of an asset has
residual rights of control over that asset; that is, the right to decide how
the asset should be used in any way not inconsistent with a prior
contract, custom, or any law (Grossman and Hart 1986). For example,
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the owner of a machine can typically decide who has access to it, the
owner of a production line can decide at what speed it runs, and so
forth.
As far as I can see, equity is just another name for ownership: the
equityholders of a firm collectively have the right to determine how the
firm’s assets should be used--in particular who should manage them,
or, to be more precise (through the choice of a board of directors), who
should oversee their management. Ownership is like any other eco-
nomic good: there is an efficient allocation of it. It is not difficult to see,
for example, that if a single agent 1 takes actions that cause an asset A
to be productive (agent I might learn how to operate it, say), then it will
often be efficient for 1 to own A. In particular, if some other agent 2
owns A, then 2’s ability to exclude 1 from access to A may diminish l’s
return from his asset-specific activities, thus causing him to underinvest
in these. On the other hand, if several agents take actions, each of which
has a positive payoff in conjunction with A, then some form of shared
ownership (for example, a partnership) may be optimal, since this will
allow each agent to receive at least some return on his activities (Hart
and Moore 1988).
Sometimes a single-ownership arrangement, even though it may be
efficient, will not be feasible. For example, suppose agent 1 is the only
agent who causes asset A to be productive--and therefore on efficiency
grounds 1 should own A. It may be the case that 1 does not have the
funds to buy A (asset A may initially be owned by somebody else, or A
may not have been constructed yet). Under these conditions the best
arrangement may be for agent I to borrow the funds necessary to buy A.
What this means is that I owns and controls the asset unless he (or she)
fails to repay his loan: in this event, the creditor has the right to seize the
asset, that is, the residual rights of control shift to the creditor.1 The
advantage of such an arrangement is that agent 1 still has an incentive
to take actions that increase the asset’s productivity since he benefits
from these in non-default states, but at the same time agent I is given a
strong incentive to repay his loan. In particular, such an arrangement
may be superior to one in which the creditor owns the asset from the
beginning and employs agent 1 to work with it. (Under these condi-
tions, agent 1 will on average get a smaller fraction of any productivity
increase.)
The situation just described is one where a liquidity-constrained
"manager" raises funds from a single investor-creditor. However, in
many cases, several investors will finance the asset’s purchase. The
manager could again borrow from each of them. Now, however, it is
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necessary to specify more carefully what happens in a default state.
Obviously, it is impossible for residual control rights over the asset to
shift to each creditor. Instead, each creditor could be given the right to
foreclose on some fraction of the asset (if it is divisible) or the right to sell
the whole asset and divide up the proceeds on a pro rata basis (if it is
not).
An alternative to borrowing from several investors would be for the
manager to issue equity in the asset, that is, to give each investor control
rights or votes in the asset from the beginning. Again a variety of
arrangements is possible, depending on the power each equityholder
has to act alone. In the case of a divisible asset, one could suppose that
each equityholder has the right to liquidate his pro rata share of the
whole asset at any time (open-ended mutual funds are set up in this
way). In the case of an indivisible asset, however, it is more natural to
suppose that some degree of consensus is required before the equity-
holders can act; for example, that it takes a majority to unseat manage-
ment (or the board of directors). The latter is, of course, the standard
practice in public corporations.
Many other arrangements are possible in addition to pure debt and
pure equity. One obvious one is for the firm to issue combinations of
debt and equity. Another is for the firm to issue various hybrid
securities. For example, the firm could promise to hand investors either
a fixed amount of money or a certain fraction of equity at a future date,
with the choice being up to the firm (preferred shares are defined in this
way); or the firm could issue debt that can be converted into equity at
the investor’s discretion (convertible debt); or it could issue options--
that is, sell investors the right to purchase future equity in the firm.
Such arrangements all involve possibly contingent exchanges of
equity (current or future) for cash (current or future). In this sense they
can be regarded as variants of debt and equity; or to the extent that debt
is itself just a particular type of contingent equity claim (the creditor gets
either cash or an ownership claim in the future depending on whether
the debtor defaults), as variants of equity itself.
So far I have spoken entirely about the votes or control rights that
accrue to equity. Of course, each equityholder also has the right to his
pro rata share of any dividends the firm pays. However, to the extent
that dividends are at management’s discretion--as they typically are--
this right almost goes hand in hand with the residual right of control
over assets, where assets now include any cash the firm disburses (over
and above cash that has been committed to others).
Nothing that I have said so far about the special features of
ownership, and various claims written on it, seems to depend on
particular assumptions about manager or investor attitudes towards
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the firm’s performance, such as earnings or profits, could be verified.
Under these conditions, the firm’s payment to creditors could be chosen
to be some function of performance. However, this simply gives rise to
contingent debt; or, if default provides investors with the right to
acquire equity rather than the right to foreclose on assets, to contingent
preferred shares. Conceptually, I see little difference between contin-
gent debt or preferred shares and their noncontingent counterparts.
In particular, it is worth stressing that the verifiability of earnings
and profits does not eliminate the rationale for equity. It is true that with
earnings and profits verifiable, management can be put on some sort of
incentive scheme. Given that the firm has assets, however, it will still
matter who has control over these. For example, regardless of the
incentive scheme, a situation where outside investors are the equity-
holders and can fire management (or the board of directors), perhaps
with compensation, and hire a new management team to operate the
assets, is very different from a situation where mai~agement owns the
equity and can veto any management change. Moreover, the incentive
scheme itself can be thought of as part of the firm’s financial structure;
it is just a contingent debt from the firm to management ( the firm owes
management a sum of money as a function of the profit level realized).
Franklin Allen might accept much of the above, but argue that even
though the theory survives the extension to verifiable profits or earn-
ings, the real question is why we do not see in practice the types of
contingent debt or equity that such an extension suggests we should.
This is similar to the question of why (arguably) we do not see the highly
nonlinear incentive schemes that principal-agent theory predicts, and I
don’t have a good answer to it.2 1 can, however, give an answer. It may
be the case that those variables that would impart useful information
about managerial performance--and on which we would like financial
structure to be contingent--are costly to observe and verify, while those
variables that can be verified more easily are not that informative.
Earnings or "profits" seem to be examples of relatively uninformative
variables since they are open to a good deal of manipulation by
management. Allen argues in his conclusion that, by a result of
Holmstrom, even a variable that is only slightly informative should
(almost always) be included in an optimal incentive scheme or as part of
an optimal financial structure. However, as far as I know, this is true
only if management’s actions are unidimensional, which is not the case
if management can, say, divide its time between leisure, making profit,
and manipulating the accounts. Under these conditions, making the
Not all principal-agent models predict complex schemes, however. See, for example,
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manager’s salary (or financial structure) sensitive to earnings may be
positively undesirable since it may cause him to devote too much time to
manipulation. In addition, Holmstrom’s result is no longer valid if
observation of additional variables is costly. Thus, it may not be so
surprising after all that most debt is not contingent.
In conclusion, I believe that recent work on optimal financial
structure has more robust foundations than might be apparent at first
sight. We are still a long way from a theory that can explain the
simultaneous use of debt, equity, preferred shares, and the like, but I
believe that the control rights approach does offer some hope for the
development of such a theory in the future.
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Robert C. Merton*
I agree with Oliver Hart that Franklin Allen’s survey article covers
the literature rather well. Hart, as I hoped he would, has discussed in
detail some of the specific theoretical papers to which Allen refers. I
would, however, briefly mention two relevant theories that were not
explicitly discussed by either Hart or Allen. One is the work of Oliver
Williamson on so-called transaction cost economics, as perhaps an
alternative to agency theory, wherein the unit of analysis is the "trans-
action" rather than the "firm." The other is some work that my
colleague Carliss Baldwin has done over the years, which I (not she,
perhaps) would characterize as the "strategic capital" theory. This
second theory may be illustrated by two examples. First, a dominant
firm in an industry may not have as much debt as, say, tax theory would
suggest, because by having more equity capital, the firm can credibly
threaten to cut prices and suffer losses in order to deter competitors.
Second, consider a firm bargaining with another strong entity such as a
union. By carrying substantial debt, the firm can reinforce its bargaining
position by threatening to shut down, should the union insist on too
great a wage settlement or on employment contracts that, in conjunction
with the debt, are too burdensome. Perhaps names of some companies
will,come to mind that, in the past year or so, have assumed consider-
able debt, suffered huge losses, and now appear to be using the threat
of bankruptcy to renegotiate employee labor contracts.
Before discussing the debt-equity question, I would like to reinforce
*George Fisher Baker Professor of Business Administration, Harvard University
Graduate School of Business Administration.DISCUSSION 45
Allen’s observation that many of the financial innovations of the last two
decades, although heralded as novel, were not entirely new. Consider,
for example, exchange-traded stock options and futures contracts. In the
seventeenth century, options and contracts resembling futures ac-
counted for the bulk of transactions on the Amsterdam stock exchange,
which at the time was the financial center of the western world.
Moreover, from the accounts given by Joseph de la Vega (1688), it
appears that the concerns raised about these contracts in Amsterdam at
that time (for example, insider trading, manipulation, excessive specu-
lation and price volatility, and default risks) are much the same as those
expressed about options and futures trading today. It is perhaps not
surprising that as we resurrect ancient financial instruments, we revisit
ancient financial problems.
My contribution to this session is essentially a negative report. I
would suggest that promising explanations of why nonfinancial busi-
ness firms issue the variety and mix of debt and equity instruments that
they do are probably not to be found on the "demand-side" for these
securities. That is, other than for financial intermediaries, the firm’s
choice of capital structure should not rest on the tastes of investors and
theories of investor risk-sharing. As I have discussed elsewhere (Merton
1989; 1990, Chapters 14-16), finance theory in the context of well-
developed financial markets would largely rule out nonfinancial busi-
ness firms issuing a variety of financial instruments solely to satisfy the
risk-sharing needs of investors. Financial intermediaries and specialized
"zero-supply" markets (for example, futures and options) can meet
these needs more efficiently. Thus, such a priori reasoning implies that
the issuance of multiple types of financial instruments by business firms
is not driven by the demand side of the market for these securities.
Hence, one should look to the supply side (for example, corporate tax,
regulation, and agency issues) for explanations of this issuing activity.
In further elaboration on this point, business firms need not issue
instruments other than equity in order for investors to achieve an
efficient blend of risk and returns in their portfolios. For example, if a
business firm issues only shares, a separate entity like a mutual fund, a
financial intermediary, or a holding company could acquire these shares
as assets and finance their acquisition by offering investors various
claims with payoffs contingent on these shares. Such partitioning of the
payoffs could, for example, emulate the payoffs to "junk" bonds.
Collateralized mortgage obligations and collateralized bond obligations
are examples of such intermediation.
By using intermediation in this fashion to separate a business’s
operations from its financial structure, the system permits investors to
acquire the instruments they demand while insulating the operations of
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essentially permits "no-fault default." For instance, suppose an inter-
mediary issues two securities against the shares of a firm. The first
promises to pay a fixed amount in, say, two years; the second is a
residual claim against the value of the shares. In the case of a default, the
intermediary turns over the assets of the firm to the holders of the first
type of security. Thus, the first security has essentially the same
structure as junk debt, but without the prospect of bankruptcy costs.
This arrangement allows for all the demand-driven risk-sharing entailed
by junk debt, but in the case of a default, the company’s operating
management is not influenced a whit. I would suspect that most
policy-makers who are worried about default, especially on junk debt,
are not worried about some investors failing to be paid in full; what they
are really worried about is a failure of the financial system and broad
disruption of the real sectors of the economy, due to the effects of
widespread default on business operations.
The separation of financial structure from business operations is not
just hypothetical. This separation already functionally exists in the
options market. The expiration unexercised of a call option on a stock is
equivalent to a no-fault default. I have not seen these option expirations
trigger any response from managements of the underlying firms or
anyone else. Another example of this separation is the Americus Trust
structure, which funds a trust with shares of a company’s stock (for
example, DuPont) and finances the share purchases by issuing two
types of securities called "’primes" and "scores." The prime is entitled to
all dividends on the stock and a fixed payment at maturity of the trust.
The score receives the residual value, if any, at maturity of the trust. The
prime security is functionally equivalent to a junk bond on a highly
levered firm with operations the same as the underlying stock.
Investors’ behavior also suggests that it is very unlikely that
theories of risk-sharing are crucial for explaining the financial strategies
and capital structures of businesses. I think that the evidence shows that
given a choice, investors are really more concerned with controlling the
risk of their portfolios than with controlling the risk of the individual
securities that constitute their portfolios. Option contracts on individual
stocks, for example, initially were traded very actively, but after options
on portfolios of stocks were introduced, the volume and use of individ-
ual options dropped dramatically.
Not only does the separation of the business operations from its
financial structure make possible no-fault default, it also reduces the
moral hazards that arise when management is beholden to only a subset
of the firm’s investors (that is, its stockholders as distinct from its
creditors). Management, when it is disconnected from the firm’s finan-
cial structure, has no particular reason to choose a dividend policy or
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firm’s liability holders, equityholders, while injuring another group of
its liability holders, such as the firm’s creditors. Consequently, the
separation of the business from its financial instruments seems to be
compelling in almost every respect if the only role for such instruments
is the efficient sharing of risk among investors.
I believe, however, that an adequate theory of business behavior
must consider liabilities that do not appear on business balance sheets as
well as those formal financial liabilities that do. Accordingly, not all
liabilities can be managed by an intermediary distinct from the business.
For example, a firm’s obligations to customers, suppliers, and employ-
ees entail risk-sharing. If customers have long-term, unfulfilled con-
tracts with a company, these contracts become liabilities just like debt. I
would suspect, however, that this type of liability would be less
significant for companies with relatively generic and nondurable prod-
ucts. If you buy Kleenex tissues and Kimberly-Clark goes out of
business, you are not worried that you will fail to obtain facial tissues
elsewhere. But if you invest heavily in software that works only on one
kind of computer, then discontinuance of warranty and hardware
support for that computer can be very costly.
Finance theory already provides powerful tools for analyzing the
complex financial instruments to which Allen and Hart allude. For
example, the tool of contingent claims analysis (see Merton 1990,
Chapters 11-14) permits one to convert each of the complex securities
issued by firms into an equivalent portfolio of unlevered equity and
short-term, default-free debt. By making this conversion for each
security, one can thereby compare the risk profiles and functional roles
of seemingly quite different types of financial instruments.
Theory can also help us distinguish important policy issues from
those that are not. For example, most observers would agree that the
levering of corporate America during the past decade has caused both
corporate debt and equity returns to become more volatile. This obser-
vation has often been used to conclude that such levering has increased
the riskiness of American firms. Theory tells us that the riskiness of both
debt and equity increases with a corporation’s leverage, but paradoxi-
cally the riskiness of the whole firm’s value (that is, the sum of debt plus
equity) may not change at all and may even decline. Consequently,
when the returns on equities and debt are described as being more
volatile than before, one cannot infer anything about firms as a whole
being more risky. Similarly, one can ask whether institutional investor
portfolios of debt and equity have become more risky. Debt and equity
returns, taken separately, are almost surely more risky today than in the
past. But, debt returns today are less volatile than equity returns in the
past. And, institutional investors now hold more corporate debt relative
to equity than they did. Thus, it is entirely possible that their total48 Robert C. Merton
equity-cum-corporate-debt portfolios are no more risky today than they
were five or ten years ago. Essentially, these large investors are, in total,
holding the same underlying assets that they did before, but their
separate financial claims are just packaged differently.
In closing, a word on future empirical work: During the past
generation, finance has relied on large sample-size, generic data bases
(for example, stock and bond market prices) as the core for testing
hypotheses. However, I think that in the future many of the issues
surrounding business financial behavior and risk sharing will be re-
solved using smaller sample-size, specialized data bases gathered
through good field work. For example, as we all know, there is a
signalling theory for explaining dividend policies of firms. Although
stock market data support this theory to a degree, these data support
alternative theories as well. We might resolve this issue in large part by
interviewing one hundred or more boards of directors to discover how
much time they spend on setting the dividend and what factors they
considered in making their decisions. More generally, such field work
might help distinguish among the alternative theories of optimal secur-
ity design discussed in Allen’s paper.
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